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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To identify the critical dimensions of
hospital Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) involvement in
a quality and safety initiative and to offer practical
guidance to assist CEOs to fulfil their leadership role in
quality improvement (QI).
Design: Qualitative interview study.
Setting: 20 organisations participating in the main
phase of the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) programme
across the UK.
Participants: 17 CEOs overseeing 19 organisations
participating in the main phase of the SPI programme
and 36 staff (20 workstream leads, 10 coordinators
and 6 managers) involved in SPI across all
20 participating organisations.
Main outcome measure: Self-reported perceptions
of CEOs on their contribution and involvement within
the SPI programme, supplemented by staff peer-
reports.
Results: The CEOs recognised the importance of
their part in the SPI programme and gave detailed
accounts of the perceived value that their
involvement had brought at all stages of the
process. In exploring the parts played by the CEOs,
five dimensions were identified: (1) resource
provision; (2) staff motivation and engagement;
(3) commitment and support; (4) monitoring
progress and (5) embedding programme elements.
Staff reports confirmed these dimensions; however,
the weighting of the dimensions differed. The
findings stress the importance of particular actions
of support and monitoring such as constant
communication through leadership walk rounds and
reviewing programme progress and its related
clinical outcomes at Board meetings.
Conclusions: This study addressed the call for
more research-informed practical guidance on the
role of senior management in QI initiatives. The
findings show that the CEOs provided key
participation considered to significantly contribute
towards the SPI programme. CEOs and staff
identified a number of clear and consistent themes
essential to organisation safety improvement.
Queries raised include the tangible benefits of
executive involvement in changing structures and
embedding for sustainability and the practical steps
to creating the ‘right’ environment for QI.
ARTICLE SUMMARY
Article focus
▪ To qualitatively identify the perceived critical
dimensions of hospital Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) involvement in a quality and safety
initiative: the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI).
Key messages
▪ The findings show that the CEOs provided key
participation that they and others considered to
significantly contribute towards the SPI
programme.
▪ Five primary managerial roles within the SPI pro-
gramme were identified: (1) resource provision;
(2) staff motivation and engagement; (3) com-
mitment and support; (4) monitoring progress
and (5) embedding programme elements.
▪ Queries raised include the tangible benefits of
executive involvement in changing structures and
embedding for sustainability and the practical
steps to creating the ‘right’ environment for
quality improvement (QI).
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This study addresses the call for more research-
informed practical guidance on the role of senior
management in QI initiatives. It makes an
evidence-based contribution to the quality debate
around leadership in healthcare by drawing on
original empirical material collected across 20
UK healthcare settings. The findings impart guid-
ance for other managers at this level opting into
a similar intervention and outline certain actions
pertaining to different stages of the programme.
▪ The CEOs’ self-reports may be subject to social
desirability bias. Similarly, self-selecting bias
may derive from the fact that the CEOs volun-
teered for the high-profile initiative, arguably
leading to an overestimation of the involvement
that senior managers at this level would typically
engage in within most improvement initiatives
within their Trusts. However, we have tried to
lessen this limitation with supplementary ana-
lysis of staff views.
▪ No association can be made between the CEOs’
dimensions and the successes/failures of the SPI
programme.
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INTRODUCTION
The number of quality improvement (QI) initiatives in
the healthcare sector is growing rapidly. Their aim is to
improve processes, structures and systems through con-
tinuous QI techniques in order to improve outcomes of
care.1–3 Research examining these programmes and
larger-scale collaboratives have found some evidence of
their impact;4 their sustainability5 6 and economic bene-
ﬁts.7–9
Effective support from senior managers is believed to
be critical to the success of their programmes.10–12 In a
review of healthcare Board level and senior manage-
ment behaviours associated with QI outcomes,
Øvretveit13 identiﬁed a plethora of studies that impart
the importance of managerial involvement and engage-
ment in quality and safety improvement. Actions fre-
quently referenced as beneﬁcial included displays of
senior management commitment and support14 and cre-
ating the right culture.15 However, Øvretveit13 concluded
that there is little research-based practical guidance to
outline the details of the senior management role in
leading improvement and called for more academic
research on this topic. This study addressed the issue by
exploring the self-reported participation of Chief
Executive Ofﬁcers (CEOs) involved in the second phase
of an organisation-wide quality and safety collaborative,
the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI), to better understand
the role of Board level senior managers within such
initiatives.
SPI and our previous research
Funded by the UK Health Foundation, the SPI was devel-
oped by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI).
It was piloted with four UK National Health Service
(NHS) organisations in its ﬁrst phase (2004–2006) and
applied at a further 20 in its second phase (2006–
2008).16 17 Designed to achieve improvements in patient
safety, SPI attempted to make changes at an organisa-
tional level and in front-line care processes within four
clinical areas through implementing a number of clinical
working practices with continuous QI and process meas-
urement techniques. The main elements of the SPI pro-
gramme are outlined below in box 1. Today, many of the
principles of SPI have continued with 18 of the involved
organisations opting in to the follow-up initiative ‘The
Safer Patients Network’.
In our previous research, we have investigated a
number of factors affecting the SPI programme. These
include organisational readiness for SPI, clinicians’
engagement with SPI, leadership walk rounds prescribed
by SPI and predictors and perceptions of impact of SPI.
In the pilot phase of SPI, survey responses by those
involved (clinical leads, coordinators and management)
rated senior management support as the highest-ranking
strength in the implementation of SPI.18 Additional
qualitative analyses revealed manager involvement as a
reported facilitator of medical engagement in SPI.19
This involvement comprised allocating resources, having
good management–doctor relationships and commit-
ment at executive management level. Other interview
ﬁndings showed that senior managers helped to remove
barriers and empower staff to change processes through
events such as leadership walk rounds.20 In research
on the main phase of SPI, we extracted further perspec-
tives on leadership walk rounds that revealed that they
can help executives learn about their organisations and
help clinical staff overcome misperceptions of the
executives.21
In our longitudinal quantitative work, programme
implementation factors, including senior management
processes, were found to contribute signiﬁcantly to
change in organisational safety climate and capability
linked to programme milestones, above and beyond the
effects of programme contextual factors and organisa-
tional preconditions.22 We have not previously identiﬁed
which senior management behaviours are perceived to
Box 1 The Safer Patients Initiative—a description
SPI aims
▸ Mortality: 15% reduction
▸ Adverse events: 30% reduction
▸ Ventilator-associated pneumonia: 0 or 300 days between
▸ Central line bloodstream infection: 0 or 300 days between
▸ Blood sugars within range (intensive care): 80% or more
within range
▸ MRSA bloodstream infection: 50% reduction
▸ Crash calls: 30% reduction
▸ Harm from anticoagulation: 50% reduction in adverse events
▸ Surgical site infections: 50% reduction
Workstreams (example change elements)
▸ Perioperative care (deep-vein thrombosis prophylaxis,
β-blocker use) reduction
▸ Medicines management (medicines reconciliation, anticoagu-
lants) reduction
▸ General ward care (early warning systems, rapid response
team and hand hygiene) reduction
▸ Critical care (ventilator bundle, central line bundle and daily
goal sheets) reduction
▸ Leadership (leadership walk rounds, strategic prioritisation of
quality and safety) reduction
Programme tools and methodology
▸ Continuous quality improvement: semiautonomous teams
▸ PDSA cycles and small tests of change
▸ Incremental spread to successively larger work systems
▸ Process measurement and analysis of run charts to determine
effects
▸ Expert faculty support from Institute for Healthcare
Improvement (site visits, conference calls and online email
support) reduction
▸ Large-scale learning sessions for multidisciplinary improve-
ment teams
▸ Online extranet for uploading and comparing process data
with monthly feedback
▸ Collaborative learning community for networking and sharing
best practices
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be important. In other investigation across two time
points, we identiﬁed strategies for sustaining SPI that
were reported to require senior management help on
ﬁnancial and human resources for the programme, as
well as incorporating patient safety into induction and
training.23 In addition, the coordinators considered
‘management involvement’ generally to facilitate con-
tinuation of the programme and suggested that it was
essential to feedback to senior management to keep SPI
aims high on their agendas to improve their understand-
ing and enthusiasm for the programme. Exploring CEO
actions may highlight the reasons why this is important,
for example whether feedback elicited follow-up actions
by the managers. Other generic ﬁndings from investiga-
tion at the main phase revealed executive management
commitment to quality as a strength of the programme
according to ratings from both senior management and
frontline staff.24
In summary, our previous research has suggested an
importance in managerial involvement and commitment
in SPI and identiﬁed some potential dimensions of this
involvement. However, these have not been described in
detail or conﬁrmed by CEOs directly. Our speciﬁc
research aims are to identify the critical dimensions of
hospital CEOs involvement in SPI, and to offer practical
guidance and classiﬁcations that will assist CEOs to fulﬁl
their leadership role in QI.
METHODS
Sample
Setting
Interviews were carried out across all 20 NHS hospitals
participating in the second phase of the SPI programme
across four geographical locations in the UK: England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The hospitals
varied in terms of type (eg, teaching) and size. The
biggest participating Trust had a total of 22 000 staff
(not all of their hospitals were involved in SPI) and the
smallest had 2100 staff (est. June 2008). Two Trusts each
had two hospitals involved in SPI.
Participants
A purposive sampling strategy across all 20 organisations
aimed to include the CEOs at all of the participating
organisations. These senior managers were often involved
in the ‘Leadership workstream’ that governed the SPI
programme across all the clinical workstreams in which it
was implemented. This workstream were advised to walk
round the hospital in ‘Leadership Walk rounds’ and to
have a strategic prioritisation of quality and safety.
Seventeen interviews were conducted with CEOs
representing 19 of the 20 hospitals participating in the
SPI programme. There were only 17 participants
because one CEO did not participate in the interviews
(we have reason to believe this was because he/she was
busy in the process of moving on to another Trust), and
two of the CEOs managed more than one participating
hospital. Speciﬁcally, every Trust was managed by a dif-
ferent CEO and two Trusts had two hospitals participat-
ing in the SPI programme. Please see table 1 for
participant demographics.
Supplementary analysis was carried out on 36 inter-
views with staff involved in SPI to verify/challenge the
CEO self-reports. This comprised 20 workstream clinical
leads (5 per workstream), 10 programme coordinators
and 6 management (2 directors of nursing, 2 medical
directors, a general manager and a clinical governance
manager), which amounted to two interviewees per
CEO, including the CEO not interviewed.
Procedure
The data collection period was between April and
August 2008 towards the ofﬁcial end of the SPI pro-
gramme and comprised face-to-face interviews lasting
approximately between 45 and 60 min.
Interviewees were shown a research information sheet,
briefed on their anonymity and asked to sign a form
consenting to audio recording the interviews for tran-
scription and analysis. A standardised semistructured
interview topic schedule was used by two interviewers
(pairings of ﬁve different researchers, JB, AP, SB, SI and
APo), which addressed the senior managerial role along
with a host of issues regarding the programme. This is
because, as shown in the introduction, the study investi-
gated a number of issues surrounding SPI of which the
senior management role was one topic of investigation.
Example questions directly asking CEOs about their role
included: “What are your main responsibilities?” and
“How were/are you involved in SPI?” Staff were asked
Table 1 Participant demographics
Gender
Clinical/
non-clinical
background
Tenure
in Trust
Number of
SPI hospitals
overseen by
CEO
Male Non-clinical 6–9 years 1
Male Non-clinical 0–11 months 1
Female Clinical 21 or more
years
1
Male Non-clinical 3–5 years 1
Male Non-clinical 1–2 years 1
Female Non-clinical 1–2 years 2
Male Non-clinical 6–9 years 1
Male Non-clinical 0–11 months 1
Male Non-clinical 3–5 years 1
Female Non-clinical 10–20 years 1
Female Non-clinical 10–20 years 1
Male Non-clinical 6–9 years 1
Male Non-clinical 0–11 months 1
Female Clinical 0–11 months 1
Male Non-clinical 1–2 years 2
Male Non-clinical 10–20 years 1
Male Non-clinical 3–5 years 1
CEO, Chief Executive Officer; SPI, Safer Patients Initiative.
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“How was/is your senior management/executives
involved in SPI?”
Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed by professional transcri-
bers. Qualitative analysis was performed, based on
inductive grounded theory analysis techniques of open
coding, constant comparative analysis and theory build-
ing, with the aid of NVivo 8 software.25 26 The 17 CEO
transcripts were divided and independently coded by
the ﬁve researcher interviewers ( JB, SB, SI, AP and
APo). This comprised identifying any text, indirect or
direct, pertaining to the executives’ involvement
(actions, work or contributions) within the SPI pro-
gramme. This resulted in one code containing all refer-
ences to CEOs involvement. Line-by-line open coding
was then performed by one researcher (AP) on all of
the CEO transcripts to deconstruct the dataset and draw
out singular dimensions. This was also carried out on
this node coded by the other researchers to compare
inclusions. At this stage of analysis, highly speciﬁc codes
related to perceptions of CEO contributions and actions
were identiﬁed. The importance of their involvement in
the SPI programme, and barriers and enablers were also
coded to provide additional contextual information to
the managers’ roles. All references coded concerned the
managers’ actual involvement/contributions and bar-
riers or enablers faced, as opposed to their opinions on
what managers in their position should do or would
likely face. The constant comparative method was used
to compare emerging codes with earlier codes drawn
from the dataset and individual codes were grouped into
related themes in order to build a model of the main
dimensions and their subdimensions. No previous
theory was used to analyse the data, all categories were
developed from the data. After iterative reﬁnement of
the relationships, a model was identiﬁed that consisted
of the critical dimensions of the CEOs involvement
within the SPI programme, based on the CEOs’ reports.
To ensure reliability of coding and interpretation, a
sample of data fragments were checked and resolved
through dialogue with other members of the team by
one researcher (AP) identifying differences in coding
between the ﬁve coders and speaking with the coders in
question to arrive at an agreement. The model was con-
sidered by external members of the team for their
opinion on whether the subdimensions have face validity
under the chosen dimensions. The same analysis was
carried out on staff transcripts. The dimensions from
the staff reports were compared with the model that
emerged from the self-reports. The ﬁndings section per-
tains to the CEO reports, with a supplementary
summary of the reports by staff.
FINDINGS
The levels of involvement in the programme varied
between the executives; however, all gave accounts of the
value that they believed to have brought at all stages of
the process. They considered their involvement in the
initiative as a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the potential for
programme success/failure.
I went away on leave, came back, and it had just all gone
downhill because I wasn’t there. (Interviewee 8)
The most reported barrier to their involvement was
their time constraints to participate within programme
efforts, which was often attributed to the demands of
managing a large Trust. Facilitators of their engagement
included early involvement in the process (from helping
at the application stage or/and from attending the ﬁrst
learning session), learning about the programme (such
as the QI techniques, the targets set, the support net-
works available and the motivational impetus delivered
by IHI), and having other executives and staff engaged
with the programme.
it’s really important the Board is engaged early on in a
real way and that the Board begins to see the data.
(Interviewee 3)
Five primary managerial roles within the SPI pro-
gramme were identiﬁed (presented in table 2). These
dimensions are described within this section along with
example quotations provided in table 3. In terms of
weighting, the dimensions ‘commitment and support’
and ‘monitoring progress’ were referred to by almost all
CEOs. Most CEOs also discussed ‘embedding pro-
gramme elements’ and ‘staff motivation and engage-
ment’. Resource provision was mentioned less than the
others, but was still referenced by well over more than
half of the CEOs. Although not discrete from one
another, our ﬁndings show some indication of the stages
in which CEOs most get involved in these dimensions,
most notably resource allocation before the start and (to
a lesser extent) at the end of the programme, followed
by engagement, motivation, commitment and support
for staff and towards the end of the process the CEOs
are more likely to engage in decisions and strategies to
embed the programme elements in order to sustain it.
RESOURCE PROVISION
Funding to support the SPI programme was deemed
important and many CEOs recognised this as one of
their primary contributions to the programme. This
took two forms: their activities to bid and secure funding
from outside the Trust (both at the application stage of
SPI and for its continuation) and their authorisation of
internal Trust resources (both ﬁnancial and human
resources). Each organisation involved in the pro-
gramme were provided with an allotted sum of money
(approximately £270 000 per hospital) and external
resources, such as external monitoring by IHI. After the
ofﬁcial 2-year period of implementation, withdrawal of
these resources instigated plans to ensure that resources
4 Parand A, Dopson S, Vincent C. BMJ Open 2013;3:e001731. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2012-001731
Role of chief executive officers in a quality improvement initiative
Table 2 Dimensions and subdimensions associated with CEO role in SPI
First order
dimension Subdimension Dimension description
1 Resource provision 1.1 Securing funding This factor refers to the CEO function of securing funding for the
SPI programme and allocating financial and human resources to
aid the implementation and continuation of the programme
1.2 Resource allocation
2 Staff motivation and
engagement
2.1 Motivation and
empowerment of staff
This factor describes CEOs motivating, involving and engaging
clinical staff with the SPI programme through communication,
methods of empowerment and reinforcement2.2 Shared dialogue
2.3 Reinforcement of staff
involvement
3 Commitment and
support
3.1 Display of visible
commitment
This factor refers to the CEOs’ demonstration of their own
commitment to the programme along with the CEOs’ role of
support (not through resources) to clinical staff involved in SPI.
This includes ‘creating the right environment’ for staff and ‘selling’
the programme to them
3.2 Creation of right
environment/climate
3.3 Directing staff and stating
purpose
4 Monitoring progress 4.1 Reviewing SPI measures This factor illustrates the CEO activity of monitoring programme
outcome measures and regularly requesting and reviewing overall
performance on SPI, as well as indirectly generating
accountability on progress
4.2 Performance management
5 Embedding
programme elements
5.1 Strategy and agenda
change
This factor comprises of changes made by the CEOs to
strategies, agendas and processes in order to integrate SPI
procedures and practices into them, so that they are sustained5.2 Structure change and
embedding for sustainability
CEO, Chief Executive Officer; SPI, Safer Patients Initiative.
Table 3 Dimensions and subdimensions example quotes—CEO Self Reports
First order
dimension Subdimension Example quotes
1 Resource provision 1.1 Securing funding “we would probably take a paper to our Trust executive group
shortly after that [the end of IHI involvement in the programme]
with a decision…whether to continue on the current method [SPI
approach], if so, are we going to internally fund it” (Interviewee 6)
“We did make a decision to put aside a £200000 patient safety
reserve, a SPI reserve if you like, to fund the consequences of
any initiatives that might come out or any requirements that might
come out.” (Interviewee 7)
1.2 Resource allocation “we resourced the central office, if you want to call it that, and tried
to ensure that people had time, and energy, and the desire to do
the right thing there.” (Interviewee 16)
“You have to do it and do it well and do it properly and fully and
resource it properly. And I guess the NHS as a whole and to some
extent us as well have a history of getting in to projects, not
resourcing them properly, and then doing them half heartedly. And
then they never work and you wonder why, and the answer’s
bloody obvious actually. But they won’t let you do that with
SPI.”(Interviewee 12)
2 Staff motivation and
engagement
2.1 Motivation and
empowerment of staff
“I think we created the appetite. Nobody was knocking on our door
saying they wanted to do patient safety so we created the
appetite. So I guess that was top down.” (Interviewee 9)
“we’ve slowly over time ..[delegated work].. to try and increase
level of autonomy..So I suppose it was part of me trying to free up
people’s thinking actually..my first couple of meetings saying, well
what [is] 8 of those at 300 quid? Well do it you know and they just
found that really liberating because that meant they made some
really big strides in the middle of the project.” (Interviewee 14)
Continued
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Table 3 Continued
First order
dimension Subdimension Example quotes
2.2 Shared dialogue “what I see it [my role] as doing is setting an example that’s about
having the right dialogue.. And once you’ve got that engagement,
and you’ve got that dialogue, these issues become central to the
debate.” (Interviewee 16)
“talking to the staff actually and more importantly listening to the
staff about what’s going on. You always learn such a lot..When did
you last have an incident? What was, what caused it? What did
you do about it?.. How many opportunities do you get to raise
these sorts of issues?” (Interviewee 13)
“They [walk rounds] help the visibility mantra which everybody
says about executive teams don’t they? They have been an
interesting cross check about the things that you think are going
on in the organisation” (Inteviewee 17)
2.3 Reinforcement of staff
involvement
“clearly if they’ve [clinical staff] not been following our policies in
terms of hand washing and so on, they’ll be disciplined. Simple as
that..I’ve got nurses ringing me up saying I’ve told a doctor off, he
hasn’t changed his behaviour and we’re now following that up..
They’ve been talked to..some of that is about saying, excuse me,
but you are doing this actually.” (Interviewee 3)
“what I then used..saying right where are all the surgical CDs
[Clinical Directors] who are looking at their shoes, why aren’t you
doing it? And next time we meet to talk about this I want to know
your experiences on how you do it, so you sort of try and create a
purpose to it” (Interviewee 14)
“initially it was more around initial conversation with [director
name] and getting him on Board” (Interviewee 16)
3 Commitment and
support
3.1 Display of visible
commitment
“If they don’t see you believe in it [SPI], why the hell should they
struggle?” (Interviewee 2)
“I think the most important role is to be seen to be committed to it
[SPI].. It’s all very well being a figurehead, but this doesn’t allow
you to get away with just turning up for the celebratory glass of
wine or whatever it is. You’ve actually got to be in there and do
it”(Interviewee 12)
“we’ve puffed our chests up and said we are serious about this
and then we have to follow through. But what’s interesting now
that we are following through, people believe it and there is a
visible, noticeable difference in the last two or three weeks out
there on the wards in terms of consultants, they’re taking their ties
off, they’re rolling their shirts up, they’re washing their hands and
people are challenging.” (Interviewee 3)
3.2 Creating the right
environment/climate
“What a Chief Executive has to do is to build a coalition of support
to a broad framework within which people work.” (Interviewee 15)
“And it’s about creating the right climate..in some respects I
created a climate of restraint” (Interviewee 14)
3.3 Directing staff and stating
purpose
“one of the things I was keen that we did was to make this
something that the whole Board was interested in and not just the
acute hospital because some of the learning will run across other
parts of our service out in the community. So from day one we put
together a very broad communication.” (Interviewee 9)
“we have a five year vision that actually can be brought down to
one sheet of paper. Eventually it will be in several vehicles, it will
be a glossy document that will be presented to all new staff, that
will be brought out at the start of any project meeting...on the one
page one, the work SPI appears..So a Chief Executive has to do
some top down things, about setting a tone, setting a direction...
The first one [task], [is] to adopt it [SPI], to take advice, to accept
advice. The second one, then, is to learn enough about it that you
Continued
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covered by initial funding and support could be contin-
ued. The most common resources authorised by CEOs
for the SPI programme were: time allowed for SPI work
and training; data collection and data support person-
nel; and an SPI coordinator to oversee the project.
STAFF MOTIVATION AND ENGAGEMENT
The CEOs described activities that empowered, moti-
vated and reinforced staff involvement with the SPI
programme. In accounts of motivating staff, the CEOs
described ‘creating an appetite’ and ‘free[ing] up
peoples thinking’, reporting an aim of changing staff
attitudes towards the programme. Their actions to
empower staff also included allowing them more power
to authorise resources. Leadership walk rounds were
considered as a particularly useful tool for shared dia-
logue and as a listening exercise. The walk round
involved speaking with frontline staff across the hospital
and was the principal activity of the CEOs position in
Table 3 Continued
First order
dimension Subdimension Example quotes
can speak authoratively. Chief Executives have to be able to
speak about everything for 90 seconds..so a Chief Executive
needs to have a 90 second elevator speech..that you can turn to a
group of doctors, in the right situation, and say SPI is really the
thing because, and then you list whatever” (Interviewee 15)
4 Monitoring progress 4.1 Reviewing SPI measures “we are seeing well populated Run Charts, we’re being able to use
and understand the data more effectively, both at a senior level
and within the teams.” (Interviewee 9)
“I’m regularly looking at the information that is produced from it
[SPI], I wouldn’t say I’m looking at the data itself...It’s normally a
presentation, or patient story, or something like that..so that’s
changed the Board [agenda] in that you’re not straight into
finance..But whether we’re hugely different to where we were 18
months ago, I don’t know really.”(Interviewee 10)
“at the breakfast meetings..we go through all the [SPI] measures”
(Interviewee 7)
4.2 Performance management “we’ve got a different design for our performance management..
data points that will be demonstrated for assurance purposes at
the Board.” (Interviewee 3)
“I think it’s [SPI is] in our operational plan, it’s a performance
measure in there, so therefore, when we meet the divisions on a
monthly basis, one of the things we’ll be asking them for is their
SPI measures.” (Interviewee 10)
5 Embedding
programme elements
5.1 Strategy and agenda
change
“for me, it’s, it’ll [SPI will] be a way of doing things, integrated into
where we are, and it has to be key item on every agenda, the
things that’s shaping the debate.” (Interviewee 16)
“I had to make some clear statements from the word go about
where it [SPI] was on the agenda, so it was, it has been the first
item on the Management Board agenda for the last 18 months.
The patient SPI, right, where are we, what have we achieved, what
are we doing?..we’ve set, tried to set it in the strategic context of
what the Trust is doing. The Trust Board adopted a new mission
statement..that there would be three main themes..and one of
them was the Safer Patient Initiative and patient safety.”
(Interviewee 13)
5.2 Structure change and
embedding for sustainability
“[we need to] make sure that the elements of SPI that we keep are
integrated into our performance management regime.”
(Interviewee 4)
“the way we’ve rolled out SPI..we integrated it into people’s
directorate objectives, that’s why we keep the profile up.”
(Interviewee 5)
“that’s how you begin..you narrow the gap between the activities
of the initiative and disciplines around directorate management
and delivery, you narrow that by drawing it together and holding
people to account for outcomes” (Interviewee 14)
CEO, Chief Executive Officer; SPI, Safer Patients Initiative.
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the ‘leadership workstream’. Constant communication
with staff was critical to encourage their engagement
with the programme. At times the CEOs were called in
to deal with resistance to the programme, whereby they
would either discuss the situation with the resisters,
attempt to instill a sense of purpose, or in the worst
case, threaten disciplinary measures for not adhering to
SPI practices. Doctors were singled out as the profession
with the most resistors, therefore facilitating doctor
engagement was a commonly cited role. CEOs who
attended SPI learning sessions to learn about relevant
improvement practices reported that their learning
helped when engaging staff, as they were more knowl-
edgeable on various aspects of the programme, such as
QI techniques and targets set.
Another critical task was encouraging Board buy-in
through highlighting the programme strategies and
targets. An NHS Board is made up of a chairman, execu-
tives, directors and non-executives and, through regular
meetings they jointly oversee, offer direction and are
responsible for the ﬁnancial and quality performance of
the hospitals within their Trust. Employed by the Trust,
the full-time executives/directors (eg, CEO and Medical
Director) are responsible for the day-to-day oversight of
the hospitals and together with the chair and non-
executives (recruited externally to the Trust on a part
time basis) are all responsible for overall governance,
strategy, achieving performance targets and standards.
Therefore, collectively they hold inﬂuence over the
quality and safety of their organisations.
COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT
All 17 CEOs highlighted the importance of personal
commitment and most believed that they acted as a
support to staff implementing the programme. Some
CEOs described acting as a role model to others and
most agreed on the powerful effects that their visible
commitment had. Demonstrations of commitment
included: attending learning sessions; emphasising the
purpose of SPI; attending leadership walk rounds; inte-
grations of safety into the Board agenda such as safety
stories at meetings and prioritising it on the agenda;
speaking at sessions to explain the programme; and pro-
viding approval for SPI-related practices. These were
considered demonstrations of commitment to SPI
because they required observable effort by the CEOs to
prioritise, promote and become involved in the pro-
gramme. Some made the point that acting as a ﬁgure-
head is not enough, and that visible acts of commitment
need to follow. A few described the potential for loss of
momentum if their commitment was absent. Several
interviewees recognised their role in creating the right
climate and environment for others to undertake the
programme work effectively; however, they fell short of
offering detailed description of what this actually
involved. The interviewees reported to further aid their
staff with statements of purpose and direction. This
endeavour was also referred to as ‘selling’ the process.
This was done through disseminating the programme
aims and targets via workshops to staff and presentations
to the Board. The CEOs also increased their involve-
ment when SPI work activity was not heading in the
right direction.
MONITORING
Monitoring the progress of the initiative was a frequently
reported activity. The CEOs monitored progress by
reviewing SPI outcome measures, reading reports,
checking information and asking for information on
particular programme actions and challenges at Board
meetings. Outcomes were reviewed on a weekly or quar-
terly basis depending on the Trust, often in the form of
presentations, safety-style dashboards and Run Charts.23
While regularly reviewed, it was not always analysed or
actioned; however, many CEOs agreed that it both raised
awareness and ﬂagged safety issues, as well as offering
the Board an opportunity to prioritise, openly discuss,
understand and address trouble areas. Monitoring of
progress was not only to explore challenges, but also as
a way of ensuring that targets were met. Feedback to
senior management at Board/project meetings on
whether staff were complying with SPI prescribed activ-
ities was thought to be a powerful inﬂuence on staff
engagement and accountability. This is because staff
were inﬂuenced by positive or negative responses from
senior management. Accountability was generated at
these meetings through assessment of targets met and
actions delivered. The CEOs primary intention to
monitor the process and its key clinical indicators was to
become familiar with the programme and to keep track
of progress rather than to improve compliance.
Timeframes were set by the workstream leads and coor-
dinators but CEOs would query the programme leads if
they were falling behind on self-imposed deadlines and
targets. Outside of the meetings, the CEOs did not audit
the programme’s progress or compliance to it; instead
they relied on the implementers of the programme to
report back on these, especially if there were any
problems.
EMBEDDING PROGRAMME ELEMENTS
Many CEOs discussed changing system processes and
strategies in order to facilitate change necessary for new
SPI activity and procedures. Embedding them into exist-
ing systems and processes was considered the most efﬁ-
cient way to sustain practices and the most cited
approach used. The proﬁle of quality and safety targets
and plans were raised through adding SPI objectives
high on the agenda and amending strategies to focus on
SPI prescribed activity and aims. Examples included
adding SPI targets into mission statements and strategic
objectives. Integration of programme elements into
existing systems involved amendments to processes,
such as changes to performance management systems
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and strengthening lines of accountability associated
with targeted outcomes. Putting reporting mechanisms
in place and incorporating SPI elements into other exist-
ing initiatives, such as Lean (a continual improvement
process model), were other frequently quoted methods
of integration, as was including practices into staff objec-
tives and individual performance management.
Staff reports of dimensions of CEO involvement in SPI
Overall, the reports from the clinical workstream leads,
programme coordinators and other managers involved
in the SPI programme conﬁrmed that executive involve-
ment in the programme was important. The dimensions
of CEO involvement can be closely matched to those
that emerged from the self-reports (please see table 4
for example quotations) However, different weightings
were placed on the dimensions to those offered by the
CEOs’ transcripts and two subdimensions were not con-
ﬁrmed. The most referenced dimension in the staff
reports was of ‘commitment and support’, followed by
the majority referencing ‘monitoring progress’ and over
half reporting ‘staff motivation and engagement’.
‘Resource provision’ was mentioned by only a quarter of
the interviewees almost solely referring to allocation
of resources (ie, data collection, IT help and backﬁll
time) rather than securing funding. Even fewer men-
tioned the action and beneﬁts of the CEOs embedding
programme elements, with no mention of their activities
to change structures and embed programme elements
for sustainability, instead mentions were of agenda
change alone. No new dimensions emerged from the
staff data.
Despite the difference in weighting of the dimensions,
the staff reports substantiated the activities reported by the
CEOs, such as their work towards the application of the
programme, attendance at learning sessions and leader-
ship walk rounds (initially considered apprehensively by
many frontline staff but later welcomed). Moreover, the
staff reports offered further insight into why CEO involve-
ment was important and what each dimension offered to
them. For example, staff feedback and presentation to the
CEOs on SPI data measures (in the form of high-level data
and metrics in Run Charts and trafﬁc light measures) and
summaries of progress and future plans (through verbal
presentations and written reports), were reported to
provide awareness, recognition, solutions and direction
from the CEOs. These were considered invaluable, espe-
cially the recognition of staff work, and staff conveyed their
wish to avoid disappointing the CEO. This suggests beneﬁts
gained from subtle acts of listening to presentations,
reading reports, understanding and acknowledging the dif-
ﬁculties faced in implementation. The CEOs may not have
realised the power of such straightforward intangible acts.
While most staff agreed that their CEO was engaged in
the process and that their described commitment was valu-
able, they also portrayed the role of the CEO as secondary
and supplementary to their own role in SPI. The staff saw
themselves as the true implementers of the programme,
while the CEOs were perceived to be best placed to offer
assistance in the form of organisation-wide messages (state-
ments of importance of the programme), recognition, dir-
ection and trouble shooting. Staff expressed a preference
for more involvement by their CEO on the dimensions
outlined or more from this involvement. For example,
remarks cited the disappointment at the lack of feedback
and actions following the walk rounds. While examples
supported CEOs claims that they empowered staff to ﬁx
problems themselves, staff also viewed this as CEOs disre-
garding the opportunity to make organisation-wide
changes. Alongside this, some reluctance to ask for help
was communicated by the staff. There was speculation that
the CEOs were preoccupied with organisational restruc-
tures and foundation status or other higher priorities, that
they had superﬁcial reasons for being involved (ie,
funding and proﬁle) and that they were only concerned
with a couple of aspects of the whole programme (meet-
ings and walk rounds).
Lastly, the peer reports highlighted the following
activities and beneﬁts of the CEO involvement that were
not emphasised by the CEOs themselves: ensuring the
right people are nominated for the programme, acting as a
ﬁgurehead when IHI visited and meeting with the CEO of
their paired SPI organisation (the 20 organisations paired
up to share learning), maintaining external links with
primary care Trusts, and offering an organisational per-
spective across all four workstreams.
DISCUSSION
All the CEOs in this study recognised the importance of
their part in the SPI programme. The executives gave
detailed accounts of their activities and perceived value
they brought to all of the different stages of the process:
from the initial application to start the initiative,
through overseeing and encouraging the process, to its
sustainability after resources diminished. This supports
proposals that senior management make a signiﬁcant
contribution to quality and safety improvement initia-
tives in the healthcare setting.11–13 In exploring the
parts played by the CEOs, ﬁve critical dimensions were
identiﬁed: (1) resource provision; (2) staff motivation
and engagement; (3) commitment and support;
(4) monitoring progress and (5) embedding pro-
gramme elements. Staff views of CEO involvement
closely matched the dimensions that emerged from the
self-reports by the CEOs; however, the dimensions of
embedding for sustainability and resource provision did
not surface as markedly and the weighting of the dimen-
sions differed from the CEOs’ reports.
Managerial commitment was an expected ﬁnding con-
sidering the literature support for this inside and
outside of healthcare.27 28 We identiﬁed manifestations
of commitment from: attending SPI learning sessions;
leadership walk rounds; prioritising safety on the Board
agenda; talks explaining the programme; stamps of
approval for programme practices and stating its
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purpose. On the latter, research has implied the rele-
vance of senior managerial inﬂuences in building the
right culture for improvement.15 While a few of the
interviewees recognised their responsibility in this,
neither they nor the staff deﬁne these activities. Recent
articles offer managerial actions on producing a good
patient safety culture,29 but less is known on creating the
right culture for QI.
Table 4 Dimensions example quotes—Staff Peer Reports
First order dimension Example quotes
1 Resource provision “Any other support [from Board and CEO] has been around trying to acquire resources, so for
instance there’s a large infection control component and .. we’ve had a nurse on this site
who’s been collecting information around central lines, VAPs and so on and they haven’t had
that resource on the other site, because we were two separate Trusts. So they collected their
data on VAPs and other infections in a different way. Because we’re one Trust now and we’re
taking this forward, we want to have the same process on all the sites, so that’s where the
management are essential, so it’s that sort of financial and resource support” (Trust 12, clinical
lead, critical care)
“some of the changes that we’ve needed with IT and that I have pushed up to the leadership
because it’s not something I’ve been able to influence really.” (Trust 17, clinical lead,
medicines management)
2 Staff motivation and
engagement
“they’re [executives are] well equipped to give that person the idea of how to put it right
themselves. Which really empowers them more and makes them feel an awful lot better,
because then they realise that they can actually sort the problem out themselves, and they
didn’t have to go to somebody quite high up the Board to get it sorted. It was something that
they could have done themselves.” (Trust 8, clinical lead, critical care)
“we’ve got leadership rounds, and that’s made a big difference to identifying the problems on
the wards, but actually some of the problems have been given back to the wards when really
we should be saying, this is common across the Trust, let’s solve it by the Trust.” (Trust 13,
clinical lead, medicines management)
“We had such a problem with infection here, we were just desperate to do something about it
and quite a lot of the, my more dapper colleagues, were very reluctant to shed their nice suits
and shirts and, or to roll up the sleeves on their shirts because they didn’t think it looked
professional.. all the problems evaporated when the chief executive sent out an email inviting
for a one-to-one interview any clinician who didn’t wish to follow this particular policy, and I
believe no one took her up on it.” (Trust 16, clinical lead, general wards)
3 Commitment and support “I certainly know that our Chief Executive has met with all the consultants in small groups..
certainly [CEO] has said himself, if you’ve got problems then you come directly to me. If it’s
Safer Patient then you get straight access to me, and that has been really encouraging.” (Trust
1, clinical lead, general wards)
“we would feedback the activities from the previous month, our anticipation of what would
happen the following month and any issues that we were faced with, that we needed support
from the leadership team. And whether that was a resource issue or something about can’t get
clinicians involved, whatever and that was fine” (Trust 14, director of nursing)
4 Monitoring progress “there’s a quarterly report to the Trust Board.. the chief exec does a section as part of his
report each month. And then [name] or I, or both, go and talk about something specific every
quarter. So in December, it was the walk rounds and what we’d done there. And in, three
months after that, whatever it was, March, February, March, we presented to them he Run
Charts. And next time we’ll do something different” (Trust 9, general manager)
“[with CEO and management team] we will go through.. our traffic light measures.. which
would show all of our measures then and then where we are with them. Green, we’re passing
the Run Chart rows, and the amber, where we aren’t passing the rows just yet, and then the
red is if we haven’t got any data points against it.. what we do is pick on, put together a
progress report, which is then brought to a Trust Board.. and generally during the meeting we
can raise any concerns we may have about certain, about if there’s any measures that we’re
struggling with” (Trust 10, programme coordinator)
5 Embedding programme
elements
“our new chief exec has made sure that safety is put on the agenda first, so she’s also a very
good driving force for it” (Trust 8, programme coordinator)
“Go back, ask them to give you the Board agendas for about the last 18 months and you tell
me where you see clinical governance. It was always down the pecking order.. it’s now on the
agenda, it’s on the agenda as patient, as the SPI thing.. I’ve got the support of the chief exec”
(Trust 11, medical director)
CEO, Chief Executive Officer.
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Studying the components of the senior management
role in a hospital setting in the US, Bradley et al10 identi-
ﬁed that the following manager-related variables affected
their QI initiative: senior management engagement;
management’s relationship with clinical staff; the promo-
tion of an organisational culture of QI; support of QI
with organisational structures and procurement of
organisational resources for QI. Our ﬁndings are in
accord with theirs, although interestingly our CEOs
made more reference to their role as a monitor of the
process. This included reviewing SPI measures and
ensuring that programme targets were met. Due to a
divergence of perceived monitoring beneﬁts by CEOs
and staff, further understanding of the beneﬁcial ways of
monitoring could assist managers in how to best carry
out this task.
There is much recognition that QI initiatives require an
open and mutual communication between management
and clinical staff.30 31 Our interviewees emphasised that the
beneﬁts of shared dialogue with clinical staff was both to
receive input on quality and safety and to engage staff.
Indeed, senior managers have been identiﬁed as holding a
facilitating responsibility,32–34 including research from
another study on the ﬁrst phase of the SPI programme
showing importance of management involvement and
commitment.19 The present study conﬁrms the earlier con-
clusions and shows that this entails motivating and empow-
ering staff by providing them with more autonomy,
reinforcing SPI-compliant behaviours and attendance at
the learning sessions to learn about improvement practices.
Such learning is supported by studies that recommend
managers to enhance their QI knowledge.13 CEOs involve-
ment in resource provision is also supported by research
proposals that senior managers’ activities for safety include
granting resources for a comprehensive safety programme
and permitting staff time for safety.35 Our ﬁndings show
that the most common resources authorised by CEOs for
the SPI programme were time allowed for SPI work and
training, data collection and data analysis support person-
nel, information technology tools, and an SPI coordinator
to oversee the project. However, these were mostly pre-
scribed by IHI, and, while CEOS were happy with their dis-
tribution, they otherwise may have chosen different areas
to resource.
Finally, a role reported by the CEOs as essential to
achieving sustained learning and outcomes involved
embedding SPI activity and procedures into existing
organisational systems, strategies and processes.
However, apart from references to changing Board
agendas, staff made no mention of any of these strat-
egies in relation to CEO involvement. This may be
because this aspect of CEO involvement is mostly
unseen by staff or that CEOs have either communicated
their tasks differently or exaggerated their work on this.
Recommendations based on these ﬁndings are to:
modify Board agendas and prioritise safety; integrate
programme targets into mission statements and strategic
objectives; strengthen lines of accountability and
introduce reporting mechanisms associated with pro-
gramme outcomes; and incorporate programme
approaches into other existing initiatives. Change of
structures and systems by management has been shown
to assist in the sustainability of QI programmes.10 In
other analyses of the SPI programme, its integration
within organisational structures and processes featured
dominantly within strategies to sustain it.23 Such tasks
arguably ﬁt within the remit of senior management and
further support the argument that their activity is rele-
vant to collaborative methods being sustained, even if it
may or may have not been in this case study.11
LIMITATIONS
It is important to highlight that this research has not
been able to assess any association between the CEOs’
roles and successes/failures of the SPI programme. It
instead describes the CEOs’ self-reported contribution
to the programme. These self-reports may be subject to
social desirability bias, especially as the interviewees were
involved in the application process to secure implemen-
tation and additional programme funding. In a previous
research survey of 635 of the SPI participators (including
the CEOs), not only did senior management and front-
line staff have many divergent views on the programme’s
strengths, weaknesses and impact, but also the senior
managers held overall more positive views than the
frontline.22 24 Equally, the fact that this sample volun-
teered for this high-proﬁle initiative brings with it a self-
selecting bias that is arguably likely to have led to an
overestimation of the involvement that senior managers
at this level would typically engage in within most
improvement initiatives in their Trusts. However we have
tried to lessen this limitation with supplementary analysis
with staff views of those involved in SPI.
The SPI programme achievements remain unclear. In a
large formal evaluation of hospitals involved in the SPI
programme, while gains in quality and safety were found,
the gains were no larger than in the control hospitals that
were not involved in the programme.36 In particular, there
may have been improvements in speciﬁc areas in some
hospitals which were not detected by the broader evalu-
ation. The evaluators themselves further noted that
large-scale effects may take a longer time to surface.36 As
the SPI as a programme did not demonstrate overall
improvement or elucidate which organisations performed
better than others, it is difﬁcult to link CEO self-
perceptions with formal outcomes, and the existing data
does not show clear enough trends for this analysis. Lastly,
the sample size is relatively small yet can be judged respect-
able when considering that the interviewees included all
but one of the CEOs in charge of all of the NHS Trusts
that participated within SPI across the UK and when con-
sidering the low number of CEOs in the wider UK popula-
tion compared with other healthcare professionals.
Nevertheless, a larger sample that is less homogeneous
would have strengthened the study and its ﬁndings.
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CONCLUSION
This study addressed the call for more research-
informed practical guidance on the role of senior man-
agement in QI initiatives and speciﬁcally identiﬁed crit-
ical dimensions of CEO involvement within the SPI.
The ﬁndings show that the CEOs provided key partici-
pation considered to signiﬁcantly contribute towards
the SPI programme. The reports reinforce conclusions
in change management and the safety literature that
have stressed the importance of CEO involvement,
and further provide new evidence for speciﬁc critical
dimensions of CEO involvement. Queries raised
include the tangible beneﬁts of executive involvement
in changing structures and embedding for sustainability
and the practical steps to creating the ‘right’ environ-
ment for QI. In providing a case-study illustration of
the type of involvement that senior management
engage in within an improvement collaborative, and at
what stages certain actions took place, the study imparts
guidance for other managers at this level opting into a
similar intervention. The framework presented here
could provide the basis for a quantitative assessment of
CEO engagement in QI programmes, which might be
linked to trends in process and outcome changes.
Future work could also explore patterns of the types of
CEO involvement across successful and unsuccessful
sites.
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